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NEW YORK STATE ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS,
INC. V. SHAFFER*: WHEN THE SECOND CIRCUIT
CHOOSES BETWEEN FREE SPEECH AND FAIR
HOUSING, WHO WINS?
INTRODUCTION
Housing discrimination and segregation permeate
American society.' Despite the passage of the Fair Housing
Act in 1968,2 as well as a plethora of state and local statutes
designed to combat discrimination and promote diversity,
housing in America largely remains segregated by race.3
Blacks remain the most segregated among minorities, with a
disproportionate percentage of blacks living in inner cities.'
In 1985, sixty percent of blacks lived in inner cities
compared to only twenty-eight percent of non-Hispanic whites;
forty-eight percent of non-Hispanic whites lived in the suburbs,
compared to twenty-five percent of blacks.' Blacks have been
excluded from the suburbs to a much greater degree than other
minorities. Despite a forty-two percent increase in the
suburban black population between 1970 and 1980, blacks in
1980 made up only 6.1 percent of the suburban population.6
27 F.3d 834 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 115 S. Ct. 511 (1994).
See e.g., NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1978) (the Kerner
Commission's analysis of the causes for the riots that occurred in American cities
during 1966-67); see also UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, A
SHELTERED CRISIS: THE STATE OF FAIR HOUSING IN THE EIGHTIES (1983)
(discussing prevalence of housing discrimination in the United States).
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988).
3 See STANLEY LIEBERSON, A PIECE OF THE PIE: BLACKS AND WITE
IMMIGRANTS SINCE 1880 253-91 (1981); DOUGLAS MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTrON,
AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION & THE MLKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 83-84
(1993).
4ARLENE ZAREMBKA, THE URBAN HOUSING CRISIS 15 (1990).
5 Id. (calculated from U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Introductory Charactcristics-
Occupied Units (Table 2-1), in 1985 AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY.
John F. Kain, The Influence of Race and Income on Rccia! Segregation and
Housing Policy, in HOUSING DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL POLICY 99 (John .
Goering ed., 1986)[herinafter MHOUSING DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL POLICT.
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One commentator has noted that "[alithough growing numbers
of black households are buying and renting in previously all-
white neighborhoods, most of the recent increase in the
suburban black population appears to be accounted for by the
expansion of central city ghettos into adjacent suburban
communities." Data from the 1990 Census reveals that while
an increasing percentage of blacks are moving to the suburbs,
the number of blacks as compared to whites is still very small.
For example, in the New York metropolitan area, seventy-four
percent of those who moved to the suburbs were whites, while
only fourteen percent were blacks.'
At the simplest level, segregated housing results from
white homeowners' preference not to live near established
black areas.9 On another level, however, the segregation that
pervades both inner city and suburban housing derives largely
from a history of discriminatory practices on the part of local
governments, financial institutions, and real estate brokers
and investors.'" State and local governments have
promulgated municipal segregation ordinances, 1 supported
restrictive racial covenants, 2 and drafted suburban zoning
laws that prevent building multifamily rental dwellings. 3
Financial institutions have refused to offer loans to blacks; or
have imposed more difficult terms for black buyers; or have
declined to offer any loans for housing in areas where blacks
live, a practive known as "redlining."4
The real estate industry has been singled out as "the main
Kain, supra note 6, at 99 (citing U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT, 1981, table 19, p. 16 (1982)).
' Sam Roberts, New York Exports Its Talent as Demographic Tide Turns, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 1994, at Al.
' J. Linn Allen, Rare Blend: Achieving, Maintaining Diversity Is No Easy Task,
CHI. TRIB., Nov. 28, 1993, at 1C. See also, MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 3 at
88-114. For a discussion of possible reasons why whites prefer to live in
segregated communities, see infra notes 124-128 and accompanying text.
"0 Charles M. Lamb, Housing Discrimination and Segregation in America:
Problematical Dimensions and the Federal Legal Response, 30 CATH. U. L. REV.
363, 368 (1981).
" UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 2.
12 UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 2.
' Rose Helper, Success and Resistance Factors in the Maintenance of Racially
Mixed Neighborhoods, in HOUSING DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL POLICY, supra
note 6, at 174.
" Helper, supra note 13, at 174.
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cause of problems that undermine racial mixing in residential
neighborhoods." 5 Real estate brokers and salespeople use two
principal methods to effectuate racial segregation in housing:
steering and blockbusting. 6 Steering occurs when real estate
brokers direct prospective homebuyers toward or away from
particular neighborhoods based on their race. It is the single
most widely practiced form of housing discrimination. 7
Blockbusting, in turn, occurs when real estate brokers attempt
to induce or hasten "white flight" from a neighborhood "by
instilling in white homeowners the fear of an imminent racial
turnover in the makeup of their neighborhoods."
8
Federal, state and municipal governments have attempted
to combat steering and blockbusting through a variety of
measures. 9 New York State Association of Realtors, Inc. v.
Shaffer" arises from New York State's efforts to combat
blockbusting through the promulgation of nonsolicitation
orders. Nonsolicitation orders direct realtors to "refrain from
soliciting listings for the sale of residential property within a
designated geographic area."' Such orders aim to protect
' Helper, supra note 13, at 17L See also JOE T. DARDEN, APRO-AMERICANS IN
PITTSBURGH: THE RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION OF A PEOPLE (1973).
1 Charles MN Lamb, Congress, the Courts, and Civil Rights: The Fair Housing
Act of 1968 Revisited, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1115, 1146 (1981-1982), (quoting hearings
on S. 506, before the Senate Constitution Subcommittee of the Committee of the
Judiciary Committee, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 165 (1979)).
1 Id. Real estate brokers steer in two ways: (1) active steering, wher brokers
overtly advise customers where to buy on the basis of their race and; (2) passive
steering, where brokers show customers homes only in certain neighborhoods on
the basis of their race. Deborah Kemp, The 1968 Fair Housing Act: Have Its Goals
Been Accomplished? 14 REAL EST. L.J. 327, 338 (1986); Sce Comment, Racial
Steering: The Real Estate Broker and Title VIII, 85 YALE L.J. 808, 809-10, 816-18
(1976).
1 Lamb, supra note 16, at 1142. The blockbuster capitalizes on the prejudices
and fears of white homeowners and on the desire of blacks to move into suburban
areas. The blockbuster usually focuses his or her activities on white homeowners
living in transitional areas and makes representations that a minority population
is moving into the area, which will lead to decreased property values and
municipal services, and increased crime. The blockbuster induces the homeowner to
sell quickly, profiting through commissions or by purchasing the home at low,
panic prices and then selling to blacks at a premium. Sce Kemp, rupra note 17, at
333-34.
1 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)-(b), (1988) (prohibiting steering); 42 U.S.C. §
3604(e) (1988) (prohibiting blockbusting); N.Y. EXEc. LAW 296(3-b) (McKnney 1993)
(prohibiting blockbusting); ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 720, par . 590/1 (1994) (prohibiting
steering).
27 F.3d 834, (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 511 (1994).
21 [1991] 19 N.Y.C.C.R.R § 178.1. The orders prohibit any form of solicitation
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homeowners in transitional neighborhoods from being unduly
influenced into panic selling-the result of blockbusting.
In Shaffer, the Second Circuit struck down New York's
nonsolicitation orders, holding that they impermissibly
infringed on the realtors' free speech rights guaranteed under
the First Amendment.' The court found that the realtors'
speech, because it does "no more than propose a commercial
transaction,"' may be regulated by the government, only so
long as the regulation directly advances a substantial state
interest and is no more extensive than necessary to serve that
interest.' Although a state can regulate the representations
of real estate brokers, the court found that the State did not
sufficiently show that blockbusting was so significant a
problem in the designated areas as to require such an
extensive limitation on speech.' The decision in Shaffer is
indicative of the tension between antiblockbusting legislation,
which often limits realtor representations as a way of
engendering community stability, and the developing
commercial speech doctrine, which protects the speech rights of
realtors.
This Comment reviews the history of New York State's
antiblockbusting legislation and examines the procedural
history and decision in Shaffer in light of emerging theories in
first amendment commercial speech doctrine. As an alternative
to the Central Hudson test, this Comment will apply two
opposing theories of the First Amendment to the facts of
to obtain a listing for residential property, including letters, handbills, telephone
calls, face-to-face contact, and most forms of advertising, directed at or toward
homeowners in designated areas in Bronx County, Kings County, Queens County,
and Nassau County. [1991] 19 N.Y.C.C.R.R. § 178.5(a)(b)(c); § 178.6; § 178.7; §
178.8; § 178.9.
Shaffer, 27 F.3d at 845; U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Shaffer, 27 F.3d at 840 (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463
U.S. 60, 66 (1983)).
' Id. at 841 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (holding that a regulation of the
New York Public Service Commision banning all electric utilities in New York
state from advertising to promote the use of electricity was an impermissible
infringement of the First Amendment, even though the regulation's objective to
foster energy conservation was a substantial state interest)).
'" 27 F.3d at 844. The court stated, however, "we do not reach the question of
whether under certain facts and circumstances and under a different record, the
[State] might be able to justify some type of nonsolicitation regulation." Id.
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Shaffer. The first, the self-realization theory, posits that
commercial speech should receive greater first amendment
protection than that afforded by the Central Hudson test. The
second, the liberty theory, posits that commercial speech
should not receive first amendment protection. The strengths
and weaknesses of these approaches will then be discussed,
and integrated into a comprehensive analysis of the issue
culminating in the exposition of a balancing test that offers
greater guidance than the Central Hudson test.
Applying the test, this Comment will then show that New
York's nonsolicitation legislation is unconstitutional even if
blockbusting is found to be "intense and repeated." The court's
decision in Shaffer was unduly narrow. Rather than merely
holding that the particular orders are unconstitutional, the
court should have held that the underlying statute that
authorized the adoption of nonsolicitation orders was, on its
face, an unconstitutional infringement of the first mendment
rights of realtors. The Comment concludes by discussing other
options left for fighting blockbusting, and cautions against
suppressing speech as a way of promoting social goals.
I. BACKGROUND: NEW YORK STATE'S BATTLE AGAINST
BLOCKBUSTING
In 1969, New York outlawed blockbusting' and autho-
The New York law currently provides that:
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any real estate bro-
ker.., for the purpose of inducing a real estate transaction from which
any such person ... may benefit financially, to represent that a change
has occurred or will or may occur in the composition with respect to
race, creed, color, national origin or marital status of the owners or occu-
pants in the block, neighborhood or area in which the real property is
located, and to represent, directly or indirectly, that this change will or
may result in undesirable consequences in the block, neighborhoc or
area in which the real property is located, including but not limited
to the lowering of property values, an increase in criminal or anti-social
behavior, or a decline in the quality of schools or other facilities.
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(3-b) (McKinney 1993).
Blockbusting is also a violation of federal law. Section 3604(e) of the Fair
Housing Act makes it unlawful []or profit, to induce or attempt to induce any
person to sell or rent any dwelling by representations regarding the entry or pro-
spective entry into the neighborhood of a person or persons of a particular race,




rized the Secretary of State to promulgate antiblockbusting
regulations.2 7 Those regulations provided that real estate bro-
kers and salespeople could not "induce or attempt to induce an
owner to sell or lease any residential property or to list same
for sale or lease by making any representations regarding the
entry or prospective entry into the neighborhood of a person or
persons of a particular race, color, religion, or national ori-
gin." The Secretary of State also created cease-and-desist
zones. Homeowners within these zones could notify the state in
writing that they did not want to be solicited by brokers seek-
ing to obtain new property listings. All realtors were prohibited
from soliciting homeowners who provided such notification. In
addition, the regulations prohibited a real estate broker from
soliciting a homeowner who delivered to the broker a written
statement stating that he or she did not desire to sell, lease or
list their property.'
In the 1970s, in addition to issuing cease-and-desist or-
ders, the Secretary of State issued nonsolicitation orders in
areas particularly prone to blockbusting. These orders prohibit-
ed realtors from engaging in most forms of solicitation, regard-
less of whether the representations included the proscribed
language." Issuance of the nonsolicitation orders were pre-
mised on the view that white homeowners in transitional
neighborhoods face such pressure to sell their homes that mere
solicitation of listings by real estate brokers-even absent any
negative representation about minority groups moving into the
neighborhood-is sufficient to cause panic selling. The non-
solicitation orders aimed to quiet neighborhoods and protect
them from the pressures of real estate brokers intent upon
churning the real estate market."1
Many states have also outlawed blockbusting. See e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
para 70-51(b)(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971); MD. CODE ANN. BUs. OCc. & PROF. §
17-608 (1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 4112.02(H)(10) (Baldwin 1992); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 101.22(K)(2)(2m) (West 1991).
27 N.Y. EXEC. LAW 29 (3-b) (McKinney 1993); [1991] 19 N.Y.O.C.R.R. 175.17(a).
[1991] N.Y.C.C.R. 175.17(a).
[1991] 19 N.Y.C.C.R.R. § 175.17.
20 Shaffer, 27 F.3d at 836. Judicial support for the position that the solicita-
tions of blockbusters can be regulated, even if those solicitations do not include
explicit references regarding the entry into the neighborhood of persons of another
race, color, or religion, is found in United States v. Mitchell, 335 F. Supp. 1004
(ND. Ga. 1971) and Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028 (EJ). Mich. 1975).
31 See MEMORANDUM OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, STATEMENT IN SUPPORT
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New York's campaign against blockbusting has been
marked by challenges from realtors in state courts.' In 1989,
the New York Court of Appeals held in In re Campagna" that
the promulgation of a regulation that bans both lawful and
unlawful forms of solicitation exceeds the Secretary of State's
authority. The statute under which the Secretary of State had
acted prohibited only discriminatory representations by real-
tors. The court upheld the challenge stating that "[ilf the only
way to prevent blockbusting is to ban all broker solicitation in
certain areas, that is a policy choice for the Legislature, not for
the agency.'
In response to the court's ruling in Campagna, the New
York Legislature enacted section 442-h of the Real Property
Law, which expressly authorized the Secretary of State to
adopt nonsolicitation orders to combat blockbusting. These
orders could prohibit "any or all types of solicitation directed
towards particular homeowners."'
In support of the bill, the Secretary of State submitted a
OF BILL, reprinted in [19891 N.Y. LAWS 212 at 2251-52 (McKinnsy).
I In Hawley v. Cuomo, 46 N.Y.2d 990, 389 NE.2d 827, 416 N.YS.2d 232
(1979), the court struck down as arbitrary and capricious a nonsolicitation order
that covered areas of Kings and Queens counties because the state failed to show
that racial blockbusting tactics were sufficiently prevalent to "establish any ratio-
nal basis for promulgation of an order so broad in geographic scope" Id. at 992,
389 N.E.2d at 828, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 233. In Russo v. Shaffer, 131 A.D.2d 853, 517
N.Y.S.2d 212 (2d Dep't 1987), the appellate division upheld the validity of a
nonsolicitation order covering areas in Queens county.
73 N.Y.2d 237, 536 N.E.2d 368, 538 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1989).
- Id- at 244, 536 N.E.2d at 371, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 936.
"The statute provides that:
f after a public hearing and a reasonable investigation, the secretary of
state determines that the owners of residential property within a defined
geographic area are subject to intense and repeated solicitations by real
estate brokers and salespersons to place their property for sale with such
real estate brokers or salespersons, and that such solicitations have
caused owners to reasonably believe that property values may decrease
because persons of different race, ethnic, social, or religious backgrounds
are moving or are about to move into the neighborhood or geographic
area, the secretary of state may adopt a rule, to be known as a
nonsolicitation order, directing all real estate brokers and salesparons to
refrain from soliciting residential real estate listings within the suubject
area... .A nonsolicitation order may prohibit any or all types of solici-
tation directed toward particular home-owners, including but not limited
to letters, postcards, telephone calls, door-to-door calls, and handbills....
A nonsolicitation order shall not be effective for more than five years.
N.Y. REAL PROP LAW 442-h (2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1995).
1995]
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statement explaining why broad nonsolicitation orders were
necessary:
Experience has shown that home owners in many urban neighbor-
hoods are subjected to intense and repeated solicitation by real es-
tate brokers to place their homes for sale with such brokers, and
that the underlying implication of those solicitations is that property
values will be decreasing because persons of different ethnic, social
or religious backgrounds are moving into the neighborhood. These
solicitations play on the fear and uncertainty attendant with change.
Even if the words are not spoken the message is delivered. The
result is an artificial churning of the market, panic selling, and
flight from established neighborhoods. In such a charged atmo-
sphere, the mention of ethnic, social or religious prejudices is unnec-
essary.36
Pursuant to the passage of section 442-h, the Secretary of
State promulgated a nonsolicitation regulation that provided
that within a nonsolicitation area, no realtor "shall engage in
any form of solicitation where the purpose of such solicitation
is, directly or indirectly, to obtain a listing of residential prop-
erty for sale."37 While the regulation prohibited such commu-
nications as letters, direct advertising delivered by mail or
other service, telephone calls, door-to-door calls, and postings
in public places,' it allowed newspaper solicitations provided
that "such newspaper ha[d] a general readership ... through-
out a substantial portion of the metropolitan New York City
area," was published not less than once per week, and was not
distributed free of charge.39 In April 1991, following public
hearings, the Secretary of State promulgated four
nonsolicitation orders, covering areas in the Bronx," Brook-
lyn,41 Queens,42 and Nassau County.43 Shortly after the pro-
mulgation of these orders, realtors mounted a legal challenge
to the Secretary of State's actions.
3 MEMORANDUM OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 31 at 2251-52.
37 [1991] 19 N.Y.C.C.R.R. § 178.5(a).
[19911 19 N.Y.C.C.R.R. § 178.5(b).
[19911 19 N.Y.C.C.R.R. § 178.5(c).
40 [19911 19 N.Y.C.C.R.R. § 178.6.
41 [1991] 19 N.Y.C.C.R.R. § 178.7.
[1991] 19 N.Y.C.C.R.R. § 178.8.
[1993] 19 N.Y.C.C.R.R. § 178.9.
[Vol. 61:397
FREE SPEECH AND FAIR HOUSING
II. NEW YORK STATE ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS,
INC. V. SHAFFER
A. The District Court Decision
On May 28, 1991, the New York State Association of Real-
tors, Inc., [' NYSARI] a trade association of licensed real estate
brokers and local boards of realtors, and Clifford Hall, an indi-
vidual licensed real estate broker in Queens, filed suit against
the Secretary of State, in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York." The Realtors sought a
declaratory judgment invalidating Real Property Law section
442-h and the regulations promulgated thereunder."
The district court's opinion focused on the plaintiffs' claim
that the nonsolicitation statute and regulations were an im-
permissible restriction on commercial speech. 6 First, the
court reviewed the contours of the Supreme Court's emerging
commercial speech doctrine. Citing Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., the
court stated that "[tihe First Amendment protects commercial
speech from unwarranted government regulation," and defined
commercial speech as being "an expression related to the eco-
nomic interests of the speaker." 8 Then, the court set forth the
four-part test established in Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York49 to deter-
mine whether, within the context of commercial speech, first
amendment rights had been violated.'0
According to the test set forth in Central Hudson, for com-
mercial speech to come within first amendment protection, it
"New York State Ass'n of Realtors, Inc. v. Shafler, 833 F. Supp. 165, 168
(E.DqN.Y. 1993), reu'd, 27 F.3d 834 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 115 S. Ct. 511 (1994).
Id& at 167.
The plainiffi also made arguments based on the Privileges and Immunities
clause (U.S. CONSr. art. IV, § 2), equal protection clause (U.S. CONS. amend.
XIV), the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. 3604(e)), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1931-1982, and 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 186-89.
425 U.S. 748, 761-62 (1976) (holding that Virginia's ban on advertising drug
prices infringed the first amendment right to free speech).
s Shaffer, 833 F. Supp. at 171.




must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. If this first
prong is satisfied, then the court determines whether the as-
serted governmental interest is substantial. If this second
prong is met, then the court "must determine whether the
regulation directly advances the governmental interest assert-
ed, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to
serve that interest."5'
Applying the Central Hudson test to the nonsolicitation
statute, the court found that the requirements of the first two
prongs of the test were met: the speech at issue concerned
lawful activity and the state's interest in enacting the stat-
ute-the elimination of blockbusting-was a "vital goal." 2 In
applying the third prong of the test, whether section 442-h
directly advanced the asserted governmental interest, the court
reviewed affidavits submitted by the plaintiffs stating that
blockbusting practices no longer exist. The court also reviewed
transcripts of proceedings before the Secretary of State, in
which community members testified about blockbusting in
local neighborhoods. After weighing the evidence, 3 the court
found that the state had presented sufficient "generalized an-
ecdotal evidence" of blockbusting to support the conclusion that
the statute "further[ed] the governmental interest of combat-
ting the invidious practice." 4
The district court then applied the final part of the Central
Hudson analysis to determine "whether the statute [was] nar-
rowly tailored to serve only the asserted governmental inter-
est."55 The court employed an intermediate standard of re-
view:
What our decisions require is a "fit" between the legislature's ends
and the means chosen to accomplish those ends,... a fit that is not
necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily
the single best disposition but one whose scope is 'in proportion to
61 Id.
62 Shaffer, 833 F. Supp. at 173-77.
" The court applied the standard articulated in Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct.
1792, 1800 (1993): "[A] governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on com-
mercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its
restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree." In Edenfield, the Su-
preme Court struck down a Florida statute that banned in-person solicitation by
certified public accountants.
" Shaffer, 833 F. Supp. at 179.
' Id.
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the interest served,'... that employs not necessarily the least re-
strictive means but.., a means narrowly tailored to achieve the
desired objective. Within those bounds, we leave it to government
decision makers to judge what manner of regulation may best be
employed. 
6
Based on this intermediate standard, the district court found
that the New York statute was "narrowly tailored to achieve
the desired objective of combatting blockbusting.' 7 In like
manner, the court analyzed the specific nonsolicitation ordi-
nances and found that they too passed constitutional mus-
ter."
Accordingly, the district court denied the plaintiffs motion
for summary judgment, and granted the Secretary of State's
motion for summary judgment. The court also denied NYSAR's
motion for an injunction that would have prevented New York
State from enforcing New York Real Property Law section 442-
h and its regulations. On October 7, 1993, the district court en-
tered final judgment and dismissed the action. 9
B. The Second Circuit Decision
The Second Circuit reversed, in an opinion written by
Judge Meskill, holding that "the nonsolicitation regulation was
an impermissible restriction on commercial speech under the
First Amendment.' ° The court began its analysis by reducing
the plaintiffs' first amendment claim to its narrowest form:
that the "Secretary has failed to justify the establishment and
enforcement of nonsolicitation areas involved in this case. 1
The court unequivocally rejected the plaintiffs' contention that
section 442-h(2)(a) was facially invalid, reasoning that the
statute was "readily distinguishable from other nonsolicitation
statutes that on their face mandate the type of broad prophy-
"Id. (quoting Board of Trustees of the State University of Now York v. Fox,
492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (citations omitted)).
"Id. at 181. The district court also distinguished the Now York regulation
from the statute struck down by the Supreme Court in Edenfield. Id.
6Id. at 181-85.
"Id. at 189.
Shaffer, 27 F.3d at 838. The Second Circuit agreed with the district court
that plaintiffs claims, except those related to the commercial speech issue, lacked
merit. Id.
" Id. at 839.
1995]
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lactic rules that are inherently suspect."2 Thus, the court
confined its inquiry to the narrow issue of whether the chal-
lenged regulations were "valid governmental restrictions on
speech." 3
The Second Circuit followed the same method of analysis
that the district court used. The court first examined the defi-
nition of commercial speech and the scope of the first amend-
ment rights associated with such speech." The majority then
analyzed the regulations and applied the Central Hudson
test.65 Like the court below, the Second Circuit found that the
requirements of the first two prongs were met. The court then
focused on the final two prongs: "whether the regulation at
issue 'directly advances [the] governmental interest as-
serted"'-the promotion of stable and racially integrated com-
munities through the elimination of blockbusting-and "wheth-
er it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that in-
terest."6'
Like the district court, the Second Circuit majority applied
intermediate scrutiny. Here, however, the Second Circuit di-
verged from the lower court by finding that the Secretary of
State failed to provide sufficient evidence of blockbusting to
establish a reasonable fit between the asserted governmental
goal and the broad nonsolicitation order used to achieve that
' Id. The court mentioned, as examples, the statutes struck down in Edenfield
v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993) (Florida statute banning CPA's from any in-person
solitication); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 113 S.Ct. 1505 (1993) (city
ordinance prohibiting distribution of free, magazine-format, commercial handbills
through newsracks placed on public property, but permitting distribution of news-
papers through newsracks); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977)
(state supreme court's disciplinary rule prohibiting lawyers from advertising in
newspapers or other media); Linmark Associates v. Township of Willingboro, 431
U.S. 85 (1977) (town ordinance banning "For Sale" and "Sold" signs from residen-
tial property); Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (state law prohibiting pharmacists from advertising
prices of prescription drugs).
' Shaffer, 27 F.3d at 839.
"The court quoted from Bolger v. Youngs Drugs Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60,
64-65 (1983), for the proposition that "the Constitution affords less protection to
commercial speech than to other constitutionally safeguarded forms of expression."
In Bolger, the Court more narrowly defined commercial speech as being speech
which does "no more than propose a commercial transaction." Id. at 66.
Shaffer, 27 F.3d at 840-44 (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 557). For a
summary of the Central Hudson test, see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
Id. at 841 (quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566).
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goal. The court held that the nonsolicitation regulations' vio-
lated the first amendment rights of the realtors in this case.'
Judge Altimari succinctly dissented from the majority
opinion. He faulted the majority for not deferring to the dis-
trict court's weighing of the evidence that supported the neces-
sity for the blockbusting regulations. According to the dissent,
the evidence established a constitutional fit between the
government's interest in preventing blockbusting and the
means used to further that interest. Judge Altimari faulted the
majority for failing to "credit the difficulties of finding direct
evidence" of blockbusting.69
III. ANALYSIS
A. Confronting the Legacy of Central Hudson
By formulating the question before it simply in terms of
the sufficiency of proof of blockbusting, the Second Circuit
effectively dodged a larger question: whether, in a situation
where the court would have found there was sufficient evi-
dence of blockbusting in a designated nonsolicitation area, the
nonsolicitation order still would constitute an impermissible
restriction on commercial speech. The court's narrowly crafted
decision, which reversed the district court's decision on the
slimmest of grounds, reflects the confused state of current
commercial speech jurisprudence. This confusion stems from
the failure of the Supreme Court to articulate a clear, consis-
tent approach to adjudicating commercial speech cases.
Although in Central Hudson the Supreme Court attempted
to clarify its approach to commercial speech, the four-part
balancing test that it established'0 has led to a plethora of
irreconcilable decisions.71 Rather than giving much-needed
- [19911 19 N.Y.C.C.R.!L § 178.
' Shaffer, 27 F.3d at 845.
"Id.
70 For a summary of the Central Hudson test, see supra note 51 and accompa-
nying text.
71 The Central Hudson test remains too porous to allow for consistent results.
For example, as Judge Alex Kozinski and Stuart Banner have noted, the Supreme
Court has held that the government cannot prohibit certain dnds of commercial
billboards, but can prohibit the unauthorized use of certain words altogether. See
Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Spccch? 76 VA. L.
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direction to the lower courts, the Supreme Court's case-by-case
approach has led to such unpredictability that "[u]nless a case
has facts very much like those of a prior case, it is nearly im-
possible to predict the winner." 2 This inconsistency has led to
a situation in which, as one commentator has written, "almost
all of the foundational questions about first amendment protec-
tion for commercial speech remain on the table for consider-
ation and reconsideration."' It is in the context of this debate
that the Second Circuit rendered its decision in Shaffer.
1. Self-Realization and the Value of Commercial Speech
According to Professor Martin H. Redish, the constitution-
al guarantee of free speech serves one overriding value, "indi-
vidual self-realization," which refers "either to development of
the individual's powers and abilities ... or to the individual's
control of his or her own destiny through making life-affecting
decisions." 4 According to this view, other values identified as
REV. 627, 631 (1990). See also Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S.
490 (1981) (city ordinance permitting billboards limited for onsite commercial ad-
vertising, but prohibiting offsite billboards). The government cannot prohibit the
mailing of unsolicited contraceptive advertisements. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (federal statute prohibiting the mailing of unso-
licited advertisments for contraceptives). However, it can prohibit advertisements
for legal casino gambling. See Posados de PAR. Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S.
328 (1986) (Puerto Rico statute prohibiting local casinos from directing advertise-
ments at residents, but allowing advertisments directed at tourists).
72 Kozinski & Banner, supra note 71 at 631.
7' Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First
Amendment, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1181, 1182 (1988). For a review of commentators'
views see C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 194-224
(1989) (arguing that commercial speech should not receive first amendment protec-
tion); Daniel A. Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw.
U. L. REV. 372 (1979) (discussing proper scope of protection to be given to com-
mercial speech); Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffiies, Jr. Commercial
Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1 (1979)
(supporting commercial speech doctrine under which "ordinary business advertis-
ing" is part and parcel of the economic marketplace and therefore is excluded from
the protections of the First Amendment); Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment
in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 429 (1971) (arguing that there should not be a distinction between
commercial and noncommercial speech); Steven Shifflin, The First Amendment and
Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78
NW. U. L. REV. 1212 (1983) (arguing that no single, unified theory of the First
Amendment is sufficient to address the range of issues raised by commercial
speech).
74 MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 11
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central to free speech, such as those of self-government," the
checking function, 6 and marketplace of ideas,' are merely
sub-values of self-realization. Thus, Redish argues that all
forms of expression that further self-realization should receive
full constitutional protection:
Just as we require a free flow of information regarding the political
process because we value the concept of political realization, so too,
should we require an open exchange of ideas and information in the
marketplace that will help the individual govern his personal
life.78
According to this theory, commercial speech, such as advertis-
ing, which helps individuals make decisions about how best to
run their lives and maximize welfare, should recieve constitu-
tional protection. 9 According to Redish:
(1984).
7' This view, which is most closely associated with Alexander Meiklejohn, ar-
gues that the essence of American democracy is self-government by the people.
Self-government requires that the electorate be informed about thore matters
which impact upon self-governance. Alexander Mleildejohn, The First Amendment Is
an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 255. Based on this view, several commenta-
tors have argued that only speech relating directly to the political process should
receive first amendment protection. See, eg, Jackson & Jefxies, supra note 72 at
2 (arguing that commercial speech, because it is "part and parcel of the economic
marketplace," is excluded from first amendment protection). See also, Robert Bork,
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971)
(arguing in favor of constitutional protection only for explicit political speech).
Redish argues that these commentators define self-government too narrowly; he
broadens self-government to include speech that promotes private decisionmaking.
Redish, supra note 73, at 442.
76 See generally, Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory,
1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521 (arguing that freedom of speech serves the cen-
tral value of "checking" the abuse of power by the government).
" This theory is most often associated with the writings of John Stuart Mill
See JOHN STUART AILL, ON LIBERTY (Currin Shields, ed. 1956). Although contem-
porary commentators generally reject this approach, Supreme Court decisions often
speak in language supportive of it. Perhaps the most famous expression of this
viewpoint was made by Justice Holmes: 'the ultimate good desired is batter
reached by free trade in ideas--that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market" Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court af-
firmed Holmes's "marketplace" theory in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. u. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 390 (1969), stating that '[Ut is the purpose of the First Amendment to
preserve an uninhibited martketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately pre-
vail."
2' Redish, supra note 73, at 445.
71 In State Board of Virginia Pharmacy u. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
the Supreme Court employed a similar argument in determining that commercial
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By providing the consuming public with information, commercial
speech aids society in attaining its goal of intellectual self-fulfill-
ment. More importantly, commercial speech helps the individual to
plan his or her life rationally and to achieve the maximum satis-
faction possible within the reach of his or her resources. In so doing,
commercial speech serves the important catalytic function for the
achievement of personal self-realization."
Elemental to this theory is the view that the first amend-
ment right to freedom of speech resides in the consumer, or the
receiver of the speech, and not in the speaker." It follows
from Redish's analysis that New York's nonsolicitation regula-
tion deprives a homeowner of important information about the
housing market. For most homeowners, a home is among their
most significant financial investments. Hence, any regulation
that denies a homeowner potentially important information
about the possible sale of this asset should be subject to scruti-
ny.
Redish does not advocate an absolute or unlimited free
speech right, however. Only commercial speech that serves an
informational function and promotes rational enlightenment
warrants full first amendment protection. 2 Thus, fear-ped-
dling communications usually associated with blockbusting,
those which appeal to homeowners' irrational fears and preju-
dices, would receive limited scrutiny. In addition, the strong
presumption in favor of expression may be outweighed by the
presence of a compelling governmental interest;83 in this case,
the promotion of stable, diverse neighborhoods.'
New York's nonsolicitation statute, however, too broadly
restrains all solicitations, including truthful representations. A
homeowner will be prevented from receiving information about
speech should receive first amendment protection. 425 U.S. 748, 763 (1976) (ac-
knowledging that a consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information
regarding drug prices "may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in
the day's most urgent political debate").
Redish, supra note 73, at 472.
81 Redish, supra note 73, at 434.
Informational commercial speech is defined as "communication that provides
rational enlightenment to the consumer concerning the merits of a product or
brand, so that he may make a more intelligent choice in the marketplace. The
more rational information conveyed, the more 'informational' the advertising can be
considered." Redish, supra note 73, at 447.
REDISH, supra note 74, at 261.
See supra text accompanying notes 1-18.
[Vol. 61: 397
FREE SPEECHAND FAIR HOUSING
the housing market. Pursuant to the New York nonsolicitation
regulation at issue in Shaffer, the homeowner is barred from
receiving letters, postcards, handbills, leaflets or fliers, tele-
phone calls and door-to-door calls, or from seeing any adver-
tisement featured in free local weekly newspapers.' The state
action impinges on individuals' ability to govern their lives and
make decisions that might maximize satisfaction. Since the
expression conveys significant factual information that would
be valuable to homeowners, the court should have discounted
the state interest. In short, according to the self-realization
theory, the nonsolicitation order is unconstitutional.
2. The Liberty Theory: Devaluing Commercial Speech
The liberty theory articulated by C. Edwin Baker offers
another approach to the self-realization paradigm." The liber-
ty theory focuses on the speaker's right to speak, rather than
the listener's right to receive information.' According to Bak-
er,
as long as speech represents the freely chosen expression of the
speaker, depends for its power on the free acceptance of the listener,
and is not used in the context of a violent or coercive activity, free-
dom of speech represents a charter of liberty for noncoercive ac-
tion. '
The primary motivations for protecting speech are promoting
the speaker's individual autonomy, self-fulfillment and ability
to participate in democratic change.
Commercial speech falls outside the scope of this protec-
tion because, by definition, it does not represent the freely
chosen expression of the speaker. It does not arise from an
individual's use of speech "as a tool for understanding and
communicating about th[e] world in ways she finds impor-
tant."9 Rather, commercial speech arises from externally im-
posed market forces that require profit-maximization. Essen-
[1991] 19 N.Y.C.RR. § 178.5(c).
See generally, BAKER, supra note 73.
BAKER, supra note 73, at 197. For a discussion of the theoretical importance
of the listener's right to receive information, see supra note 80 and accompanying
text.
BAKER, supra at 73, at 69.
BAKER, supra note 73, at 196.
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tially, when a speaker acts in a commercial role, she is merely
an instrument of the market. The "source" of commercial
speech resides in the structure of the market itself, not in the
speaker as an individual. The "domination of profit, a
structurally required standard, breaks the intrinsic connection
between speech and any vision, or attitude, or value of the
individual.""
Applying the liberty theory to the nonsolicitation orders at
issue in Shaffer, it becomes readily apparent that regulating
the speech of real estate brokers involves no liberty interest. In
contrast to the strict scrutiny standard posited under the self-
realization theory, under the liberty theory such commercial
speech, being but a component of commercial activity, should
be regulated according to the same rational basis standard
applied to all other commercial activity. Thus, the Constitution
permits the nonsolicitation statute and orders provided that
they reasonably relate to a legitimate governmental objec-
tive.91 Given that the Secretary of State offered ample proof
that blockbusting was a problem in these particular areas, and
that the nonsolicitation orders offered a reasonable means of
combating blockbusting,92 the state's restrictions would easily
meet this low standard.
In fact, the liberty theory does not merely permit such a
statute: it actively endorses its promulgation. The non-
solicitation statute itself is an expression of political choice as
to which values society wishes to promote. It reflects citizens'
essential liberty to shape society.93 Indeed, regulation of
blockbusting counters the divisive effects of the real estate
market, forces unaffected by the larger societal goals of com-
munity stability and racial diversity.94
One aspect of the liberty theory of particular importance
in the blockbusting context is its distinction between the "prof-
BAKER, supra note 73, at 202.
91 Justice Rehnquist, who has consistently dissented from Supreme Court deci-
sions giving commercial speech a measure of first amendment protection, has
agreed with Baker's position that the government should be given a free hand to
regulate commercial speech. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 592 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Shaffer, 27 F.3d at 843-44.
BAKER, supra note 73, at 205.
" See Michael Alexander, Housing Split: No End to Trend, NEWSDAY, Sept. 24,
1990, at 7 (describing effect of market forces on real estate brokers).
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it-making enterprise" and the 'household." According to
Baker, capitalist society separates these two spheres: citizens
live out and express personal values at home and serve as
profit-maximizers in business." This distinction is pivotal in
defining those uses of property that will be protected under the
liberty theory, and those uses of property that will not. Those
uses of property that express private, personal values are pro-
tected as an important component of essential liberty. Uses of
property for purposes of market exchange, however, do not
receive comparable protection. In the market-exchange context,
the owner values property only for its exchange value. In that
context,
[sihe uses the property solely as a means to influence or gain tempo-
rary power over another. When the government restricts these ex-
change-oriented practices, it only restricts people's opportunity to
exercise power over others, not people's expression of their own
values or their own autonomy.'
The regulation of exchanges is a proper use of governmental
authority. It is an expression of collective control over the
distribution of resources and a way of favoring certain oppor-
tunities and disfavoring others.
An ironic result occurs in the context of commercial speech
related to the real estate market. Although activities within
one's home generally are protected as residing within the
sphere of liberty,S this characterization changes once the
home is placed on the market. The home's identity as a focal
point of protected liberty becomes transformed. It is "treated as
a regulatable part of the system of commerce rather than part
of the system of freedom of expression or of individual liber-
ty."99 The home becomes an asset, and speech about the home
becomes susceptible to regulation. In sum, according to the
liberty theory, the nonsolicitation ordinance at issue in Shaffer
permissibly regulates commercial speech.
BAKER, supra note 73, at 200.
"BAKER, supra note 73, at 200-02.
BAKER, supra note 73, at 211.
See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2047 (1994) ("A special respect
for individual liberty in the home has long been part of our culture and our
law.").
" BAKER, supra note 73, at 218.
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B. An Eclectic Approach: Commercial Speech and Real Estate
The self-realization and liberty theories are limited by
their absolutist postures. Both fail to balance the various com-
peting interests at stake in the commercial speech context. The
following analysis, based on Professor Steven Shiffrin's eclectic
approach, denies that any general theory can properly dictate
solutions in most actual cases.00 While informed by the self-
realization and liberty theories, this approach is inclusive in
that it accepts that the First Amendment protects many differ-
ent values and that, in a particular situation, one or more of
those values may be of increased importance. The eclectic ap-
proach balances the importance of speech against other societal
goals without presumptively elevating speech above all other
values.'0 ' This approach recognizes the reciprocal nature of
the speech right, affirms the centrality of an antipaternalistic
approach to legislation, and then weighs the utility of that
legislation. Under this analysis, the nonsolicitation regulation
does not withstand constitutional scrutiny.
1. Whose Speech Right Is It?
An analysis of the constitutional question at issue in
Shaffer requires a court to identify whose speech right ought to
be protected. As noted above, the liberty and self-realization
theories answer this question differently. Under the self-real-
ization theory, the right to free speech belongs to those who
will be denied important information that might help them
govern their lives.0" Thus the antisolicitation orders, though
1o Shiffrin, supra note 73, at 1255.
"' The eclectic approach is premised on views similar to those of intuitionists,
who believe that the "complexity of the moral facts defies our efforts to give a full
account of our judgments and necessitates a plurality of competing principles."
Shifin, supra note 73, at 1254. See also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 39
(1971).
101 The self-realization theory is discussed supra notes 74-85 and accompanying
text. Although the speech being restricted is aimed primarily at homeowners in
designated areas, the nonsolicitation regulation will affect the speech rights of a
much larger audience. Since the regulation prohibits a wide range of communica-
tions, others who will be denied information include prospective homeowners seek-
ing real estate listings as well as other members of the community using real
estate advertisements as a source of information about the real estate market.
[1992] 19 N.Y.C.R.R. § 178.5(a). See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
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commercial in nature, run afoul of the First Amendment. Con-
versely, according to the liberty theory, the right to free speech
resides in the speaker. In the context of Shaffer, because the
right-holder speaks in a commercial exchange, no speech right
is implicated.' Both approaches are flawed.
The nonsolicitation order remains too prophylactic with
regard to truthful noncoercive statements. Broad regulation
prohibiting any solicitations by real estate agents, including
truthful statements, is impermissibly restrictive. Justice Harry
Blackmun has described such a blunt approach as an "absurdi-
ty," particularly in the context of residential real estate, which
involves 'oneof the most important decisions [individuals] have
a right to make: where to live and raise their families.""'
Yet, even assuming that a speaker has free speech rights
in this instance, a successful theory must solve the problem of
how far these rights will extend. The recent decision in RAV.
v. City of St. Paul"5 signals the danger of giving commercial
speakers the same speech rights as private speakers. In
RAV., the Supreme Court struck down a city ordinance that
criminalized the placement on public or private property of any
symbol, such as a burning cross or Nazi swastika, "which one
knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger,
alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion or gender.""6 According to the Court, the ordinance
constituted an impermissible content-based restriction on free
speech.' 7
Applying such an expansive view of the First Amendment
to commercial speech undermines the very basis of consumer
protection regulation. For example, the prohibition against
content-based speech restrictions articulated in RAV. could
allow blockbusters to engage in commercial hate speech. There
must, however, be a balance. The speaker's right to speak
needs to be balanced against the homeowner's desire to be free
's For a discussion of the liberty theory, see supra notes 86-99 and accompany-
ing text.
" City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc. 113 S. Ct 1505, 1520-21 (1993)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Linmark Assocs. Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 US.
85, 98 (1977).
106 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
10. Id. at 2541 (quoting MINN. LEGIS CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
1'07 Id. at 2547.
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from unwanted speech. Certainly, a large part of commercial
speech regulation aims to protect citizens from being inundat-
ed and manipulated by commercial forces."' 8
In short, a middle ground needs to be found between the
poles of the self-realization and liberty theories that would
acknowledge the speech right's reciprocal nature. As Justice
Blackmun stated in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, "[i]f there is a right to adver-
tise, there is a reciprocal right to receive the advertising."" 9
This middle ground would grant free speech protection to indi-
viduals who want the benefit of receiving real estate solicita-
tions. Simultaneously, those who do not want to receive these
communications should have a means to protect themselves
from overly aggressive marketing pressures, particularly com-
munications that infringe upon the privacy within the home.
On the other side of the spectrum, the free speech right should
be granted to commercial speakers whose livelihood depends
on the ability to make representations to homeowners, prospec-
tive homeowners and those otherwise interested in the real
estate market.
2. Balancing the Speech Rights: Beyond Paternalism
A successful balancing approach requires the development
of guiding principles that avoid the uncertainty and unpredict-
ability of the broad balancing approach of Central Hudson. One
way to discern such a principle is by returning to Virginia
Pharmacy, a case which marked a turning point in commercial
speech doctrine. Indeed, much of the murkiness in current
commercial speech doctrine can be traced to the Court's
backpedaling from the principles enunciated in Virginia Phar-
macy."
0
"' See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 73, at 54-69 (arguing that speech that manipu-
lates and/or coerces should be regulated).
109 425 U.S. 748, 757 (1975).
110 In Virginia Pharmacy, the Supreme Court held for the first time that some
commercial speech was protected by the First Amendment, applying a "least re-
strictive means" test. In essence, the Court affirmed that true commercial speech
about lawful activity should receive as much protection as political speech. 425
U.S. at 772. Yet, within two years, the Court held that commercial speech should
receive a "limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate posi-
tion in the scale of First Amendment values." Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assoc.,
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The underlying premise of Virginia Pharmacy is that first
amendment scrutiny should be applied whenever the govern-
ment seeks to suppress the dissemination of true state-
ments."' In that case, the Supreme Court overturned a regu-
lation prohibiting pharmacists from advertising drug pric-
es." The state argued that such advertising would most like-
ly lead unwise consumers to make drug purchasing decisions
based solely on price. As a result, price competition would
lower the professional standards of licensed pharmacists,
thereby lowering the level of health care in the state.'
The Court criticized the paternalistic view the state took of
its citizens." The problem with the state's approach is that
it deprived consumers of valuable information, and also robbed
them of their dignity. According to Professor Shiffrin, 'when
government prevents willing speakers from speaking the truth
to audiences in order to manipulate their decisionmaking, it
engages in an especially offensive form of paternalism.""'
Such paternalism offends the respect citizens are owed by
government.116
Applying the antipaternalistic principle of Virginia Phar-
macy to the statute and orders involved in Shaffer, the New
York statute clearly fails. The nonsolicitation regulation, like
the statute in Virginia Pharmacy, suppresses communication
based on the fear that the response of the listening public will
impact negatively upon society. Advocates of the non-
solicitation statute fear that if real estate brokers solicit list-
ings and provide information about the housing market, home-
owners will respond by selling their homes. Other homeowners
436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
"What is at issue is whether a State may completely suppress the dissemi-
nation of coincidently truthful information about entirely lawful activity . . . [We
conclude that the answer to this . . . is in the negative." Virginia Pharmacy, 425
U.S. at 770.
u2 Id. at 750-51.
u3 Id. at 766.
U4 Id. at 769.
" Shiffirin, supra note 73, at 1259.
n' This view is reflected in both the self-realization and liberty theories. Profes-
sor Thomas Emerson, in his discussion of the self-fulfillment value as one of four
values underlying the First Amendment also asserts the centrality of human digni-
ty to first amendment analysis. ("[Sluppression of belief, opinion and expression is
an affront to the dignity of man, a negation of man's essential nature.") THomaS I.
EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 5 (1966).
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who see their neighbors selling their homes will be persuaded
to do likewise. As a result, the neighborhood will become re-
segregated.11 This rationale, like the one rejected by the
Court in Virginia Pharmacy, is based on the view that individ-
uals will misuse information that they receive.
3. Balancing Antipaternaism: The Marketplace of Ideas
The principle of antipaternalism, though helpful, remains
incomplete. Commercial speech does need to be checked in
order to properly protect consumers from being unfairly manip-
ulated. Other values, such as the promotion of racial diversity,
may override the free speech value in a particular context.
Professor Shiffrin suggests that a principle that could help
courts balance the interests of the consumer can be found by
returning to John Stuart Mill's theory of the marketplace of
ideas.1 Mill's basic claim that government should not pro-
hibit "false" speech derives from his belief in the fallibility of
the government and from the possibility that the government
may act out of bias or in an effort to repress minorities. "
Mill did not reject all regulation of speech; rather, he offered a
utilitarian approach. This approach provides an appropriate
balance to the antipaternalistic approach, because it grounds
the analysis in concrete facts. According to Mill, utility is
the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in
the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a
progressive being. Those interests.., authorize the subjection of
individual spontaneity to external control only in respect to those
actions of each which concern the interest of other people. If anyone
does an act hurtful to others, there is a prima facie case for pun-
ishing him by law. 2'
1 See, e.g., Shaffer, 27 F.3d at 836. This paternalistic approach is articulated
in the Secretary of State's statement in support of the nonsolicitation orders. See
MEMORANDUM OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 36, at 2251.
.. MILL, supra note 77, at 6-7. See also, Shiffiin, supra note 73, at 1212.
.. MILL, supra note 77, at 6-7. See also, F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILO-
SOPHICAL ENQUIRY 86 (1982) ('[ltreedom of speech is based in large part on a dis-
trust of the ability of government to make the necessary distinctions, a distrust of
governmental determinations of truth and falsity, an appreciation of the fallibility
of political leaders").
120 MILL, supra note 77, at 14. See also, John Stuart Mill, "Utilitarianism," in
THE UTILITARIANS 399-472 (Dolphin ed. 1961).
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Hence, according to Mill's approach, speech cannot be sup-
pressed simply because the majority disagrees with that
speech. Speech can be suppressed, however, if it will cause
significant harm.
In turning to the nonsolicitation statute and accompanying
orders, an eclectic approach distinguishes the marketplace con-
cern about improper government bias from the concern about
ensuring the free flow of truth in the marketplace. 2 ' The
first step, then, would be to ask whether the suppression of
information represents an impermissible government bias. The
normative answer would be, 'No." Both sides in Shaffer agree
that blockbusting is an evil that should be prohibited.
The resolution of the question then turns on whether gov-
ernmental action, on balance, promotes utility. This question
requires a fact-specific analysis of the regulation. Does the
governmental action successfully halt resegregation or promote
racial diversity? Are there other positive and negative
externalities caused by the legislation? For example, does the
legislation have the effect of limiting housing opportunities for
minorities wanting to move into these communities? What is
its impact on the real estate industry? Does the regulation pro-
mote racial stability or engender increased divisiveness?
The first question is whether the nonsolicitation scheme
effectively stops the harm of resegregation. It can be assumed
that a broad restriction, which prohibits practically all solici-
tations from real estate agents in certain areas, will be effec-
tive in stopping outright blockbusting. The pervasiveness of
housing discrimination in our society suggests, however, that
antiblockbusting regulations have not succeeded in curbing
more subtle forms of blockbusting. Because fair housing re-
mains the most controversial and emotional issue in the area
of civil rights, less progress has been accomplished in fair
housing than in any other area of civil rights." Whites are
"more opposed to living in an integrated neighborhood than
they are to working with, or having their children go to school
with minorities."'
22 Shiff-in, supra note 73, at 1270.
Lamb, supra note 10, at 369; see also, C. BULLOCK & H. RoDGERS, RACIAL
EqUALITY IN AMERICA: IN SEARCH OF AN UNFULFILLED GOAL 196 (1975).
' Lamb, supra note 10, at 369.
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Many reasons have been offered for the persistence of
housing discrimination. One is the perception that whites gain
as a result of housing segregation.124 On a psychological level,
segregated hbusing reassures whites that "there is someone
beneath them on the social ladder."1" White suburbs make
their inhabitants feel more secure, shielded from the problems
of the inner cities. 28 On an economic level, whites perceive
that the entrance of minorities into white communities will
inevitably cause property values to fall." Although research
has revealed that this perception is largely a myth, whites
continue to maintain segregated housing to protect the value of
their property."
As a result of these factors, whites tend to abandon resi-
dential neighborhoods once blacks move into white areas. "Tip-
ping" is the sociological term used to refer to the critical point
at which whites, either a single family or collectively, leave a
community, because of black entry into the neighborhood.1"
The tipping point is a "watershed-a point of black entry prior
to which white residency is a self-sustaining condition and
beyond which white departure is a self-sustaining process."
130
Although the tipping point varies with each community, rang-
ing from twenty to sixty percent of black population, the aver-
age is reported to be in the twenty to thirty percent range.
131
Tipping cannot be predicted with certainty, but research sug-
gests that white flight is a phenomenon that often becomes
irrevocable.
1 32
14 Lamb, supra note 10, at 368.
" Lamb, supra note 10, at 371 (quoting BULLOCK & RODGERS, supra note 122,
at 6.
"' Lamb, supra note 10, at 371. See also C. HAAR & D. IATRIDIS, HOUSING THE
POOR IN SUBURBIA: PUBLIC POLICY AT THE GRASSROOTS 10 (1974).
2 Lamb, supra note 10, at 371. See also, R. HELPER, RACIAL POLICIES AND
PRACTICES OF REAL ESTATE BROKERS (1969).
', Lamb, supra note 10, at 371.
" John M. Goering, Neighborhood Tipping and Racial Transition: A Review of
Social Science Evidence, 44 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 68, 70-76 (1978).
"20 Thomas C. Schelling, A Process of Residential Segregation: Neighborhood
Tipping, in RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE 166 (Anthony H. Pascal,
ed., 1972).
" Rodney A. Smolla, Integration Maintenance: The Unconstitutionality of Benign
Programs that Discourage Black Entry to Prevent White Flight, 1981 DUKE L.J.
891, 895.
12 Bruce L. Ackerman, Integration for Subsidized Housing and the Question of
Racial Occupancy Controls, 26 STAN. L. REV. 245, 255 (1974).
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Nonsolicitation legislation aims to stop white flight from
occurring in the first place. Unfortunately, the persistence of
segregation in our society and the continuing trend of whites
moving away from blacks suggests that antiblockbusting legis-
lation, although well-meaning, is largely ineffective in promot-
ing racial diversity. Though it may stop the pernicious block-
busting practices of the real estate brokers, it appears that by
focusing exclusively on the acts of real estate professionals, the
regulation fails to target the behavior of white homeowners.
Although the nonsolicitation legislation may not promote
racial diversity effectively, it is not devoid of value. Some posi-
tive externalities result. The positive effects of the legislation
reflect the values advanced by the liberty theory. Because they
limit the actions of real estate agents, nonsolicitation orders
serve to protect homeowners' legitimate privacy interests.
Blockbusters prey on white homeowners by inundating them
with solicitations of all types-phone calls and both door-to-
door and mail solicitations. The sheer quantity of solicitation
in itself becomes unnerving." Moreover, the nonsolicitation
ordinance protects homeowners from being manipulated by
fear-peddling tactics."3
The nonsolicitation legislation also requires public hear-
ings which serve a positive educational and community-build-
ing function. The hearings give the public an opportunity to
voice its concerns about blockbusting in the community and
provide a forum for education about the issue." In addition,
the hearing itself facilitates community organization. Since
blockbusters aim to break apart neighborhoods, these hearings
serve the vital function of helping to bring neighborhood resi-
dents together.36
' See Note, Blockbusting: A Novel Statutory Approach to an Increasingly Seri-
ous Problem, 7 COLUm. J. L. SOC. PROB. 538, 541-42 (1971) [hereinafter "A Novel
Statutory Approach'l.
" A Novel Statutory Approach, supra note 133, at 542.
" Pursuant to § 442-h of the New York Real Property Law, the Secretary of
State holds numerous public hearings in the process of drafting the nonsolicitation
orders. N.Y. REAL PROP. L. § 442-h(2)(2) (Nchinney Supp. 1995). There hearings
are often well-attended and are reported in the press. See, e.g., Stuart Vincent,
Steering Complaints: Elmont Residents Heap Data on State Panel, NEWSDAY, Mar.
25, 1993, at 37; Paul Vitello, Suburban Form of Apartheid, NEVWSDAY, Jan. 31,
1990, at 6.
" Community organizing is one of the most effective ways to combat blochkbust-
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On the other hand, the nonsolicitation regulations
strengthen negative externalities. First, such regulations sup-
press practically all real estate solicitations in a designated
area, both those which are expressions of blockbusting and
those which are not. This suppression restricts the free flow of
information about the real estate market. Although the restric-
tions may be defensible as a means of protecting the privacy
interests of white homeowners and promoting neighborhood
tranquility, the legislation has the effect of obstructing blacks
from moving into these neighborhoods. From the start, the
legislation dissuades real estate brokers from opening the
market to prospective minority homeowners. 7
The legislation also closes the market to many prospective
minority purchasers by raising housing costs. First, the regula-
tions have the effect of raising the price of homes in the
nonsolicitation area. The nonsolicitation orders, by making
listings scarce and difficult to obtain, effectively give a monopo-
ly to homeowners in the area. By chilling the market, those
homes that are for sale will increase in price because the sup-
ply will be limited. This, too, will have the effect of slowing the
move of those who seek to enter the housing market.
As the Shaffer court noted, nonsolicitation orders also
raise costs, by not offering real estate agents a cost-effective
method of obtaining listings.1" The resulting increased costs
of real estate broker in procuring listings will be passed on to
the purchaser, if the market can bear the cost. If the market
will not bear the cost, however, the real estate broker will bear
the loss. In that case, the real estate broker working in a
nonsolicitation zone will be singled out to pay the cost of pro-
moting racial stability in a neighborhood. In essence, the real
estate broker is bearing a tax.
The above analysis leads to the conclusion that the
nonsolicitation legislation is of limited social utility. Little
supports the view that this legislation effectively promotes
diversity or stops resegregation. The legislation is socially
useful in that it protects homeowners' privacy rights, and
ing. See, e.g., Jim Bryant, Neighbors Inc., Still Tackles Local Problems, WASH.
POST, June 29, 1983, at 25.
"' A Novel Statutory Approach, supra note 133, at 551-52
' Shaffer, 27 F.3d at 844.
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serves as a vehicle for public education and community build-
ing. These positive features are outweighed, however, by the
negative externalities: suppression of information, exclusion of
blacks and minorities from neighborhoods, raising of housing
costs, granting of a monopoly to homeowners and taxing of the
real estate industry.
In sum, an eclectic approach leads to the conclusion that
the legislation should be struck down. Due to the excessive
paternalism of the legislation and its low social utility, the
nonsolicitation legislation improperly impinges on free speech
rights and is therefore unconstitutional. The statute authoriz-
ing the establishment of nonsolicitation zones is also a highly
suspect infringement of free speech rights. Despite the Second
Circuit's disclaimer that its narrow ruling striking down the
nonsolicitation orders did not "reach the question of whether
under certain facts and circumstances and under a different
record, the Secretary might be able to justify some type of
nonsolicitation regulation under 442-h,"" 9 it is readily appar-
ent that any future nonsolicitation order will be vulnerable to
constitutional attack-unless it is utterly toothless.
One type of state remedy remains available to stop block-
busters and promote racial diversity. By statute, real estate
brokers are prohibited from soliciting a homeowner who has
stated to a broker, in writing, that he or she does not "desire to
sell, lease or list such property.""'0 This "cease-and-desist"
statement protects homeowners' privacy rights and promotes
community stability. Unfortunately this remedy can become
time-consuming for the homeowner, since it requires the home-
owner to contact each real estate firm individually. Another
negative aspect of the cease-and-desist statement is that it is
essentially private. It does not provide an opportunity for
neighbors to alert each other about blockbusting in the
neighborhood.
A more effective version of this remedy is the cease and
desist zone. The Secretary of State has the authority to estab-
lish a cease-and-desist zone when it is determined that "some
owners of residential real property within a defined geographic
339 Id.
10 [1991] N.Y.C.C.R. § 175.17(b)(1).
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area are subject to intense and repeated solicitation."
Homeowners located in the zone may file a statement with the
Secretary of State asking not to be solicited by real estate
brokers. The Secretary of State then compiles the list of these
homeowners and sends them to real estate brokers. Brokers
are prohibited from soliciting these homeowners. The cease-
and-desist zone, besides being less costly and time consuming
for the homeowner, ensures that all brokers fall under the
order.
The cease-and-desist remedy properly balances free speech
interests. Just as an individual has a right to the free flow of
information, so too, does an individual have the right "to be let
alone."' In balancing these interests, the Supreme Court
"has traditionally respected the right of a householder to bar,
by order or notice, solicitors, hawkers, and peddlers from his
property."143 A cease-and-desist remedy reflects the concerns
of the liberty theory by respecting the rights of the autonomous
individual while allowing the real estate broker to speak until
he or she is asked not to.
The cease-and-desist remedy, however, lacks a community-
awareness function. Whereas the nonsolicitation zone requires
public hearings, which could galvanize community activism to
combat blockbusters, the process of creating the cease-and-
desist zone does not. Thus, public hearings should become part
of the process of establishing cease-and-desist zones.
Although the cease-and-desist remedy remains a valid
option, it is still too limited because it is merely a defensive
action. Like the nonsolicitation order, it is not a direct solution
to the problem of white flight or persistent resegregation.'
Repressing speech to promote integration is a discount remedy
with little impact. Without an accompanying policy supporting
racial diversity, such laws reflect a lack of legislative serious-
ness or commitment. Repression of speech will not solve the
problem of racial segregation and its attendant symptoms. If
' N.Y. REAL PROP. L. § 442-h(3)(2) (McKinney 1995).
42 Rowan v. United States Post Office, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970).
14 Id. at 737; see also Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148-49 (1943)
("[a] city can punish those who call at a home in defiance of the previously ex-
pressed will of the occupant").
144 See DERRICK A. BELL, JR. RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 745 (3d ed.
1992).
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society wants seriously to promote housing diversity, more
speech, not less, will be necessary.
CONCLUSION
Racial segregation in residential housing remains one of
the most intractable problems in the area of civil rights. In an
effort to halt the phenomenon of "white flight" and
resegregation, New York state has promulgated nonsolicitation
legislation. This legislation, rather than directly addressing the
problem of racial discrimination and prejudice, combats block-
busting by suppressing representations of real estate brokers.
In doing so, the nonsolicitation remedy runs afoul of the First
Amendment.
The Second Circuit erred by narrowly holding that the
nonsolicitation orders were unconstitutional because the Sec-
retary of State did not present sufficient evidence of blockbust-
ing in each geographical area. The court's narrow holding has
opened the door for the State to continue to test the limits of
the commercial speech doctrine by promulgating new non-
solicitation orders, despite the likelihood that they, too, will
eventually be struck down. The Second Circuit should have
held that the nonsolicitation statute itself was unconstitution-
al, thereby foreclosing future attempts to suppress speech as a
way of stopping blockbusting. It should have sent a signal to
the legislature that new, more effective ways to combat hous-
ing discrimination and segregation, and promote diversity
should be pursued.
David P. Kasakove
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